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BOOK REVIEWS
1964. Edited by Donald A. Giannella.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Pp. 280. $6.00.
This volume, as indicated in its subtitle, is "an annual review of church
and state and of religion, law, and society." It was prepared at the Institute
of Church and State of the Villanova University School of Law, and was edited
by Donald A. Giannella. The second in the series, this volume covers the period
from September, 1963, to September, 1964. It includes seven essays on churchstate questions, a review of books published during the year dealing with such
questions, and a survey of legal developments, including court decisions and
legislative activity.
Perhaps the most interesting essay in the book is one by Peter R. Saladin,
a lawyer with the Swiss Federal Department of Justice, in which an attempt
is made to establish a relative ranking for the preferred freedoms of religion
and speech. That is to say, starting with the assumption that both of these
freedoms hold a preferred position in American constitutional law, Mr. Saladin
tries to prove that freedom of religion is more securely established in our legal
system than freedom of speech. Perhaps the use of the phrase "preferred freedoms" is unfortunate, since Justices today do not use it, but no one would want
to dispute the fact that the two freedoms of religion and speech hold commanding positions in the hierarchy of American rights today. Furthermore, while the
author seeks to describe the American society's toleration factor in terms of the
clear and present danger test, he fails to understand that there are at least two
major versions of that test, the Holmes-Brandeis test, as enunciated in Schenck
v. United States,' and the test adopted by Justice Sanford in Gitlow v. New
York 2 The author makes the point that the clear and present danger test was
"refined" by the Court in Dennis v. United States,3 but he neglects to explain
that aside from the adoption of some of Judge Hand's rhetoric what the Court
actually did was to reassert the Gitlow version of that test. This point is important, because the outer limits of society's toleration factor depend upon the basic
theory on which decisions are made to rest.
Mr. Saladin is impressed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sherbert
v. Verner,4 which held that a Sabbatarian was constitutionally entitled to get
unemployment compensation benefits in spite of her refusal to accept employment requiring work on the Sabbath. He also believes that the state courts have
applied this case in a dramatic way to give wider protection to freedom of religion, citing as examples the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court that
religions objectors must be excused from jury duty,5 and the ruling of the
California Supreme Court that persons who use peyote, a nontoxic hallucinogen,
in their religious services must be free from prosecution under a state criminal
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER:
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law which forbids the use of such drugs.6 In fact, the peyote case reappears
over and over again in this volume, and seems to have acquired the status of
a leading decision.
On the basis of a review of a fairly limited number of cases, Mr. Saladin
concludes that "society tolerates more undesirable kinds of conduct in the
interest of freedom of religion than it does in the interest of free speech. .... '
In a few instances, he is able to pair up cases which deal with about the same
facts, but which came out differently due to the presence or absence of a religions
factor. Thus, he notes that in one case the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute handbills and circulars door-to-door was upheld,' whereas a few years
later, in a case dealing with magazine solicitors,9 the Court upheld an ordinance
which prohibited peddlers from soliciting orders from home dwellers without
first obtaining their permission. Although he recognizes that the rationale in
the later decision is not entirely clear on the point with which he is concerned,
he calls attention to other decisions which were most favorable to Jehovah's
Witnesses in cases involving license taxes on religious activities, which the Witnesses almost always won."0 While he emphasizes the importance of the place
of religion in American life which is suggested by the religious exemption from
the military draft, he did not anticipate the broad construction which a unanimous Court would give to the definition of religion in United States v. Seeger"
in 1965. For here, the Court ruled that the term "Supreme Being" does not
mean the orthodox God, and that "a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the statutory definition."' 2
Mr. Saladin set for himself a very considerable task, with serious methodological problems, and it is not at all clear that he has established his point,
though it is probable that religion fares somewhat better than speech in the
courts. I do not believe that the peyote case proves that more socially harmful
behavior is tolerated under the banner of religions freedom than under that of
freedom of speech. One could cite many cases in which claims to religious
freedom have had to yield to other social considerations, as in those dealing with
faith healing and fortune-telling, and various health considerations. On the
other hand, anyone who put his mind to it could make quite a long list of cases
which upheld claims to freedom of speech in situations which posed very serious
problems to the communities involved. The author has made an interesting
attempt to weigh one series of cases against another, and while he is not entirely
persuasive, he has suggested a line of inquiry which one may hope other scholars
will undertake to explore.
Mr. Saladin concludes his interesting discussion with the observation that
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since freedom of religion is accorded "the supreme place in the hierarchy of
American civil rights," it is necessary that the courts should define the term religion with "clarity and precision," and goes on to assert that "only claims with
a transcendental basis" should be recognized. 3 This is contrary to the Supreme
Court's decision in the recent Seeger case, and it is also contrary to the needs of
our highly pluralistic society. Mr. Saladin seems to believe that one type of
conscience is entitled to more weight than another; this is a dubious proposition,
and American courts do not seem to be moving in his direction.
The other item in the book of major interest relates to shared-time, which
seems to be the most promising available expedient for resolving the impasse
over state aid to religious schools. An essay by Theodore Powell, consultant to
the Connecticut State Department of Education, reviews the steady growth of
shared-time programs, and concludes that in 1964 one or more school systems
were operating a shared-time program in 35 states. What shared-time amounts
to is that parochial school pupils take some of their courses in public schools;
in other words, they are part-time public school students. The subjects most
frequently offered in shared-time programs are industrial arts, vocational training and home economics, though some are given in instrumental music, physical
education, physics, chemistry, driver training, foreign languages, general science
and advanced mathematics. After reviewing a number of local shared-time
experiments, in East Hartford, South Bend, West Allis, Bennington, Maywood,
and Chicago, Mr. Powell concludes that "Catholics who once were popularly
regarded as against public education are now pressing for admission of their
children into public schools."' 4 On the other hand, he observes that "those who
once were critical of parochial schools and Catholic isolationism are now trying
to raise barriers against a mixing of Catholic and public school pupils."'" While
this may be true in some circles, on the whole the concept of shared-time has
found wide acceptance in non-Catholic circles.
Professor Wilbur G. Katz, of the Law School of the University of Wisconsin, contributes a brief note on the constitutionality of shared time. In
general, he observes that recent decisions of the Supreme Court have made
it clear that the constitutional separation of church and state is not absolute,
and he reviews his familiar thesis that what the "no establishment" clause of
the Constitution requires is government neutrality with respect to religion. He
regards shared-time programs as being valid because they further the principle
of neutrality, since they serve a secular purpose in making affirmative provision
for the promotion of religious freedom. For when the state provides children
who attend parochial schools with education in the physical sciences and related
fields, "this is certainly government action with a secular purpose and effect."' 6
Professor Katz could find very little law on this subject. He did locate one
decision in Pennsylvania which squarely sustained the admission of parochial
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school students to a manual training program in a public school. 7 Opinions
of state officials seem to be divided on the subject. Officials in California, Iowa
and New York have ruled that shared-time programs are unlawful, whereas
officials in Illinois, Ohio and Oregon have ruled the other way. Quite wisely,
Professor Katz does not venture any broad generalization or prophecy as to
the future of shared-time in the state appellate courts.
The opening essay in this volume, by Robert G. McCloskey, Professor of
Government at Harvard University, makes two points. One is that the Supreme
Court is now trying to break the cake of custom rather than preserve it, since
the Justices in recent years have regarded themselves as "the chief initiativesupplying agencies in American government."' This means that in the religious
field the Court has run into serious compliance and backlash problems, a fact
which is amply substantiated by other writers in this volume. His other major
point is that litigation in this field poses serious questions with respect to standing
to sue, since he regards the alleged injuries and dangers put forth in this litigation as being quite negligible, "low on the scale of evils in our imperfect world."1
Thus he concludes that "a strong case could be made for judicial avoidance of
the whole issue of state aid to religion,"2 and that "this highly ambitious Court"
has made itself particularly vulnerable by not limiting itself to religious freedom
issues. In other words, the Court has more important things to do, and the
alleged evils in most of the religion cases are not very serious.
This is, at best, an arguable position. Who is to say what is serious and
what is trivial? Furthermore, what is serious to one man is trivial to another.
In the absence of an objective calculus of pleasures and pains, each person must
decide for himself. Apparently those who are willing to risk neighborhood hostility and assume the heavy expenses of litigation believe that serious issues are
involved. Surely they do not become trivial merely by pronouncing them to
be such. In a broader sense, the main business of the Supreme Court in recent
years has been in the field of the Bill of Rights. It seems a bit incongruous to
advise the Court to go back to its commerce and contract cases and leave these
matters of church and state alone. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that
the Court does not solicit its cases; parties start cases, and if parties insist upon
litigating issues under the establishment clause of the Bill of Rights, it is difficult to see how the Court can refuse to hear them, since the Justices have an
obligation to do equal justice to all. Of course there is a de minimis doctrine in
the law, but there are very persuasive reasons why it should be used very sparingly.
The well-known English scholar, Norman St. John-Stevas, contributes
an essay on the birth control issue. That this is an explosive issue religiously
is, of course, well-known, but the author maintains that opinion on the desirability of contraception has changed more than the law on the subject.
Unfortunately, this essay was written before the Supreme Court decided the
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Griswold case2' in which it ruled that the Connecticut legislative ban on contraceptives violated some generalized right of privacy secured to all by various
provisions of the Constitution. Certainly the Court did not even appear to
consider the point urged by this writer, that birth control statutes are bad because they enforce the doctrines of a particular religious denomination. Mr.
St. John-Stevas brings together a great deal of useful information about birth
control, and particularly about the pill, and he concludes that where people
are so sharply divided in a pluralist society on religious grounds, the issue ought
to be left to private conscience, though he also finds that the various religious
lines are tending to converge on this subject.
In an essay on religious freedom and social change, Arthur Gilbert, staff
consultant and director of the project on religious freedom and public affairs
of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, develops the theme that
much of the fear and suspicion which have divided America's religious groups
in the past are being overcome, and that dialogue among them has emerged.
He sketches in brief the history of religious bigotry in the United States and
discusses what he calls the era of the Court. Even so, he calls attention to the
widespread disobedience to the Court's decisions which are to be found at the
grass-roots level. But when Mr. Gilbert asserts that the Founding Fathers never
intended that the federal government should exercise control over state actions
through the first amendment, he is undoubtedly right; but later Founding
Fathers wrote a fourteenth amendment guaranty of liberty into the Constitution which was explicitly intended to apply federal restraints upon the states.
Furthermore, after praising judicial restraint, the author expresses the hope that
the Court will exercise self-discipline to the end that there will be a minimum
of interference with local control of public school policy. Perhaps it ought to
be stressed that greater restraint on the part of local authorities will result in
fewer occasions for federal intervention. In any event, Mr. Gilbert is delighted
that our religious leaders are now talking to each other, and we must all agree
that this is a good thing. Likewise, we can all agree with his argument that
the settlement of religious differences by means other than litigation is perfectly
sound. Litigation has accomplished much, and the Supreme Court has been
a powerful educator in this field of human experience, but other methods are
better, among them inter-faith dialogue.
Philip Wogaman, Professor of Bible and Social Ethics at the University
of the Pacific, discusses the first National Study Conference on Church and
State, which was convened by the National Council of Churches in February,
1964. He describes the conference as "a model of ambiguity,"2 but he also
regards it as an important first effort. Among other things, Professor Wogaman
believes that the conference demonstrated the fact that anti-Catholicism has
clearly lost its power to determine Protestant-Orthodox thinking, and that such
thinking is less likely to be based on constitutional grounds than previously. He
also believes that Protestant thinking is less committed to rigid separationist
positions, and that the conference was characterized by more relativism and a
21
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greater awareness of the pluralistic character of American religious life. Nevertheless, he states that the dominant mood of the conference was one of support for
recent decisions of the Court which prohibit officially prescribed prayers and
devotional Bible readings in the public schools. It is also worth noting that the
conference endorsed the shared-time concept as the most creative solution
available for the problem of state aid to parochial schools.
Finally, Mother Patricia Barrett, Professor of Political Science at Maryville
College of the Sacred Heart in St. Louis, contributes a perceptive summary of
books on church-state questions published during the year, and the editor of the
volume contributes a splendid summary of the cases and statutes of the year on
these subjects.
This annual summary of church-state problems, and especially legal problems, is an invaluable contribution to American scholarship, and it is to be hoped
that the series will continue indefinitely. Religion reaches far and wide into
all aspects of American life, and the confrontation of the state with the church
is so important that it ought be under continuous study on this scale. Churchstate relations have long been in a murky state, but the picture is getting brighter
all the time, and it is comforting to chart the considerable improvements from
which all of us should derive genuine satisfaction.
David Fellman*
MAN.By Herbert Marcuse.1

Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
Pp. xvii, 257. $6.00.
Criticism, no matter how cogently expressed, will not assure avoidance of
error, but without it disaster would be inevitable. The horrors of nuclear war,
the destruction of civilization, even the ending of all life, are ever present threats.
Marcuse suggests that the threat of an atomic catastrophe serves to protect the
very forces which perpetuate the danger. Advanced industrial society which
sustains these forces is subjected to searching criticism in these studies published
under the title of One-Dimensional Man. Invoking the teachings of philosophers and other thinkers, both ancient and modem, and supplementing their
wisdom with many acute insights of his own, the author has provided what
may prove to be very salutary indictments of the crimes against humanity committed by all of us. He has focused his attention on tendencies in the most
highly developed contemporary societies, and he has offered some challenging
hypotheses-for further consideration and study. By way of example, Marcuse
states that the most telling evidence of the tendencies of advanced industrial
civilization can perhaps be obtained "by simply looking at television or listening
to the AM radio for one consecutive hour for a couple of days, not shutting off
the commercials, and now and then switching the station." 2
The facts upon which the theoretical discussion is based are those set forth
in such books as The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Berle and
Means, White Collar by C. Wright Mills, The Hidden Persuaders,The Status
ONE-DMENSIONAL
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Seekers, and The Waste Makers by Vance Packard, The OrganizationMan by
William H. Whyte, and The Warfare State by Fred J. Cook. Marcuse has sought
to supply the theoretical analysis lacking in these works and in doing so displays
great indebtedness to Hegel, Marx, and Freud, and also to Theodor W. Adorno,
Serge Mallet, and Francois Perroux.
At the dawn of the industrial age Wordsworth exclaimed: "The world is
too much with us." Today it is with us all the time and we cannot escape.
There is only one "dimension" for the "totalitarian personality" of our time.
One-dimensional reality prevails not only in the common occupations of life,
but also in the universities and scientific institutions. One-dimensional thinking
is exemplified in the operational interpretation of concepts in physical science
as expounded by P. W. Bridgman in The Logic of Modem Physics, behaviorism
in the social sciences, and the analytical philosophy now dominant in many
academic establishments.
Marcuse minimizes the effectiveness of seemingly opposing tendencies:
The reign of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism
rules, and that the spiritual, metaphysical and bohemian occupations are
petering out. On the contrary, there is a great deal of "Worship together
this week," "Why not try God," Zen, existentialism, and beat ways of life,
etc. But such modes of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory to the status quo and no longer negative. They are rather the
ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation,
and are
3
quickly digested by the status quo as part of its healthy diet.
Marcuse emphasizes the similarity of totalitarian tendencies and applications thereof on both sides of the Iron Curtain and maintains that advanced
industrial society, despite its rationality of detail, is irrational'as a whole.4 He
asks how can the tremendous resources of advanced industrial society "be used
for the optimal development and satisfaction of individual needs and faculties
with a minimum of toil and misery."'
Operationalism, behaviorism and positivism all converge in a managerial
mode of thought. The managerial mode of thought and the administered life
of each individual in our society are subjects for criticism. The inner limitations
and prejudices of scientific method are referred to, but the author disclaims the
advocacy of "some sort of 'qualitative physics,' revival of teleological philosophies,
etc." 6 What he advocates is critical "negative thinking." Critical philosophic
thought, however, can "open a realm of knowledge beyond common sense and
formal logic." 7
Marcuse states:
The philosopher is not a physician; his job is not to cure individuals but to
comprehend the world in which they live-to understand it in terms of
what it has done to man, and what it can do to man. For philosophy is
(historically, and its history is still valid) the contrary of what Wittgenstein
3
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made it out to be when he proclaimed it as the renunciation of all theory,
as the undertaking that "leaves everything as it is." And philosophy knows
of no more useless "discovery" than that which "gives philosophy peace,
so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question."
And there is no more unphilosophical motto than Bishop Butler's pronouncement which adorns G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica: "Everything is what
it is, and not another thing'-unless "is" is understood as referring to the
qualitative difference between that which things really are and that which
they are made to be.
Marcuse advocates "the pacification of the struggle for existence" and
"the emergence of a new idea of Reason." The new idea of Reason is expressed
in Whitehead's proposition:
"The function of Reason is to promote the art of life." In view of this
end, Reason is the "direction of the attack on the environment" which
derives from the "threefold urge: (1) to live, (2) to live well, (3) to live
better." (Emphasis added.)
The great vice of advanced industrial society is the employment of men
as "things" rather than as rational human beings. This theme is developed
throughout the book. Other voices will be encouraged to protest against the
sins of our society. The philosopher will hearten those who strive in our courts
to safeguard our human freedom.
Roger Paul Peters*
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